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Global Security Environment: Challenges and Prospects January-March 2009 Arvind Kumar

There seems to be a consensus worldwide among the members of the strategic and academic community that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been the greatest danger to the global security. The nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are commonly characterised as the WMD. The real challenge before the international community has been to contain the proliferation of WMD. The rise of nonstate actors and their networks worldwide has made the current international security situation worst. It is generally believed that the non-state actors might have been trying to acquire any one or all the components of WMD or might have already acquired it. The assertion that such things are not possible or difficult to acquire may not be true. The possibility of acquisition of WMD by terrorist group more particularly by the Al Qaeda networks can not be ruled out.

The report of the commission on the prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism: WORLD AT RISK was released on December 2, 2008. The US intelligence reported on global trends that the use of nuclear weapons will grow increasingly likely by 2025. It has been clearly highlighted by the US intelligence that such possibility exists because of the growing persistence of the terrorist groups and rogue states. The “World at Risk” report has added a different dimension to the US intelligence report on global trends. It has highlighted that the terrorists are likely to use nuclear or biological weapons in the next five years. The time span mentioned in the report that the use of nuclear or biological weapon is most likely in the next five years by the terrorist groups in particular has once again reinvigorated the ongoing debate on the global security environment.

This is a product of the bi-partisan commission appointed by the American Congress in 2007 chaired by Bob Graham with Graham Allison, Robin Cleveland, Steve Rademaker, Tim Roemer, Wendey Sherman, Henry Sokolsky and Rich Verma as members. The greatest dangers highlighted by the commission on the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism are the rapid proliferation of nuclear technology in countries such as Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. The current proliferation of biotech industries worldwide has also become a major source of concern for the international community because of the lack of adequate security in this sector. The existing poor security in the biotech industries has increased the vulnerability and the terrorist groups might like to exploit this situation and get hold of some of the biological agents, which can be used as a silent killer of the human beings. It has been accepted by the bi-partisan commission that Pakistan has emerged as the weakest link in world security.

So far, Pakistan has been a close US ally but unfortunately it has emerged as an epicenter of terrorism and finds place in all the discussions on terrorism worldwide. Pakistan’s inability to contain and eradicate terrorist links and networks has made the whole globe a dangerous place for the humanity. The report clearly has highlighted the degree of vulnerability emerging from Pakistan and to quote from the report, “were one to map terrorism and weapons of mass destruction today, all roads would intersect in Pakistan”. Hence, it is a well accepted fact and the inference drawn from the bi-partisan commission that Pakistan has been supporting the terrorist networks and the United States itself might become a victim one day. The commission report has highlighted that the terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain biological than nuclear weapons, with anthrax as the primary mode.

It is a well known fact that the terrorists have already tried chemical and biological weapons – nerve gas in the Tokyo subway, anthrax mailed to US public figures. So far, the nuclear weapons and materials have been left out. However, it is believed that the Al Qaeda group and other terrorist’s network must be trying to procure and obtain such nuclear materials. They have definitely expertise available with them to build atleast a crude nuclear device or may like to use radiological material in the form of the so called dirty bombs. The most difficult step in making a nuclear bomb is obtaining the fissile materials either plutonium or highly enriched uranium. There may be several routes for the terrorists’ group to acquire nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. The first option might be to make an attempt in stealing one from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons in nexus with the security. The second option would be to buy from a country if that country is in dire crisis and overtly supporting terrorism. The other route would be to buy or steal from some other subnational group that had obtained it by one of the above mentioned ways.

If the terrorists are successful in obtaining and acquiring fissile material, it would be much easier for them to transport and detonate it. Hence, the need of the hour would be to prevent the theft or illegal purchase of fissile materials because stopping terrorists from transporting and detonating a bomb would be a tough proposition. It is, therefore, most important to control and contain at the source itself. Unfortunately, there have been a number of documented cases of real theft of kilogram quantities of real weapons usable nuclear material. It is again well known that the International Atomic Energy Agency has a database that includes 18 incidents involving seizure of stolen highly enriched uranium or plutonium that have been confirmed by the relevant states.

Comes of the greatest threats to peace now come from terrorist groups. The major recommendations made by the commission to the new US administration are mostly related to the safeguarding of uranium and plutonium stockpiles. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States has been spending billions of dollars for securing and maintaining nuclear weapons, materials, and technology in erstwhile Soviet Union. The other recommendation made in the report is to strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US in particular and the other nuclear weapon states (UK, Russia, China and France) in general according to the NPT definition have so far absolutely failed to meet their legal obligations enshrined in the Article VI of the NPT, which talks about nuclear disarmament. In many ways, the US nuclear doctrine itself has weakened the NPT regime. Instead of showing genuine commitment towards achieving a nuclear weapon free world, the US has been talking about its reliable replacement warhead (RRW) programme where it has been intended that the US would be putting primacy to the nuclear weapons and keep refining its stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The US in the current global security environment should set an example by showing and signaling to the world that it is interested in the elimination of nuclear weapons. By doing so, it can only prevent new countries including Iran and North Korea from possessing uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capabilities. The US would require to find ways for making the role of nuclear weapons decimated. The estimated yield from all the nuclear weapons in the world today is 5,000 megatons—the equivalent of 2,500 World War IIs.

From a bioterrorism perspective the bi-partisan commission report has cautioned the US in particular and the international community in general that the possibility of getting hold of biological weapons and its use by the terrorist group will always be high. Biological weapons employ viruses, bacteria and other germs to produce diseases, which kill people in large numbers and do not destroy the infrastructure. The serious concerns relating to biological weapons use have been reflected in the report. The US and Russia possess almost the entire worldwide stockpile of biological and chemical
weapons, which is approximately 60,000 metric tons. It can wipe out 60 billion people. The world currently comprises of about 6.5 billion people. Anthrax spores occur naturally around the world in soil and certain animals and they can be easily used for biological warfare. The need of the hour is to urgently tighten security in domestic bio-sphere institutes and laboratories. The mushrooming of biotechnology sector across the world has made this area highly vulnerable.

It must be reiterated here that the bi-partisan commission report has mentioned Pakistan a number of times and few recommendations made in the report have been related to the need for securing and protecting nuclear and biological materials in Pakistan. The whole world is worried about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. There is a growing concern among the members of international community that the WMD materials might fall in the wrong hands and that can easily create havoc globally. The report clearly has mentioned that parts of Pakistan’s territory are currently a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other terrorists. It is reiterated again in the report that in term of the nexus of proliferation and terrorism, Pakistan must figure on the top of the agenda for the next President and Congress.

After 26/11 incident at Mumbai in India, there has been a great deal of mounting international pressure on Pakistan to act and dismantle all the terrorist networks functioning from Pakistani soil. India was able to build international consensus and mobilize international opinion against Pakistan after collecting and analyzing a number of evidences gathered during the 48 hours operation during the attacks on India’s iconic hotel Taj and Trident in Mumbai. The release of the report of the bi-partisan commission just after a week of Mumbai attack and the concerns and reflections made in the report validated India’s claims. Pakistan on January 15, 2009 has declared that it has shut down five training camps of the outlawed Jamaat-ud-Dawa outfit. With this, Pakistan has admitted for the first time of the presence of terror facilities on its soil. It was possible only because of the international pressure built this time against Pakistan.

Undoubtedly, the current global security environment warrants the international community to forge an international consensus and a coalition to secure weapons of mass destruction. The commission report is very timely and relevant and it is anticipated that the recommendations made in the report would be taken seriously by the new administration in the US. Such detailed account would certainly help in understanding the complexities involved with the larger framework of the current international security calculus.

References

1 http://www.preventwmd.gov/report/
2 http://www.preventwmd.gov/static/docs/report/worldatrisk_full.pdf

Al Qaeda, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Pakistan, Terrorism Bird Flu: A Lethal Threat January-March 2009 Reshmi Kazi

In early January 2009, bird flu resurfaced with the death of a Chinese woman who was infected with the H5N1 strain of avian influenza in the eastern Shandong province in China. Only two weeks before this, the Chinese media had announced the death of a 19-year old woman from the disease. Reportedly, the woman died after she came into contact with poultry in the market. This is the second reported death caused by bird flu in China since the beginning of the year. This deadly pandemic, also known as avian influenza is the worst of its kind in medical history. It has erupted several times in Asia since 2003 having caused 247 human deaths and it has led to culation of a large number of poultry.

Avian influenza is a highly contagious viral infection, which can affect all bird species. However, the poultry is particularly susceptible to it. There are two types of influenza viruses that infect poultry – Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) and Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza (LPAI). HPAI is the more virulent form of influenza infecting the poultry with a flock mortality rate of almost 100 percent. The clinical symptoms of HPAI infection may vary from sudden death with little or no overt symptoms to a more characteristic disease with excessive swelling of sinus tissues, swelling of the head, skin becoming loose, coughing, sneezing and diarrhoea. Bird flu viruses are transmitted through primary and secondary methods. Primary transmissions are mainly through migratory birds like waterfowls, gulls and shorebirds that act as potential carriers of bird flu viruses. Secondary transmissions are mainly by mechanical transfer of infected faeces, in which viruses may be present in high concentrations.

In India, bird flu outbreaks have occurred on eleven occasions since 2006. Though there has been no human death reported, the pandemic has significantly hit the poultry industry and has generated serious concerns within India. The latest outbreak of bird flu virus was reported early January 2009 in West Bengal. West Bengal officials confirmed that they had begun culling about 60,000 poultry. This was the fourth outbreak of the deadly virus in the State since 2007. The third outbreak which resulted in the culling of 17,000 poultry was done barely a fortnight ago in December 2008. In November and December 2008, H5N1 a virulent strain of bird flu was detected in backyard and commercial poultry in several districts of Assam. To combat the spread of bird flu infection, nearly 4.3 lakh birds were culled. Earlier, in April 2008, the deadly H5N1 strains infected backyard poultry in Tripura that led to the death of 3000 domestic birds and at the same time several dogs and jackals which consumed the affected birds were also found dead. Around 20,000 birds were culled as part of the operation. In July 2007, the highly pathogenic Qinghai strains of bird flu, capable of infecting humans, were detected in Manipur.

The frequent outbreak of bird flu pandemic in Asia and India is alarming. Poultry is a vital source of food and income security in Asia, which is demonstrated by the fact that the region has 200 million small farmers, who have between 10 to 100 birds each in their farms. In India, the poultry population is very large (about 150 million). The high rate of fatality of avian influenza is a serious concern for the authorities. Many people have been subject to economic insecurity because of the culling operations undertaken to contain the spread of the virus. In many cases, people have not been compensated adequately. Many neighbouring countries like Bhutan have stopped importing poultry from India because of fears of the bird flu virus. As a consequence the revenue that is derived from poultry export by India has been severely affected.

Apart from spelling economic disaster, the bird flu crisis poses a grave threat to national security. It is important to note that all the above mentioned affected states in India share international borders with countries like Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan that have all been affected by avian influenza. In China, bird flu outbreaks have also been incessant. India remains vulnerable to bird flu virus outbreaks because of the geographical proximity with its neighbouring countries. Porous borders are also another source through which infected poultry can be smuggled into India. Transmission can take place because of the trucks that are transferring poultry and from farm to farm contaminated equipments and clothing and shoes. In fact, the Qinghai strains of bird flu detected in Manipur in July 2007 are believed to have originated from China’s mid-western province of Qinghai. The natural habitat is attractive centre for many migratory birds that migrate to India from the neighbouring areas particularly in the winters. At present, with thousands of migratory birds flocking to Dharamshala region, there are rising concerns of an outbreak of the deadly H5N1 virus. Reports from the United Nations indicate that due to continuous circulation of the highly pathogenic H5N1 strains in Bangladesh, the virus may have got entrenched in the Indo-Gangetic plains of India and Bangladesh. This exposes India to significant risks of the fatal avian influenza virus.

Avian influenza is a deadly virus that can pose serious health concerns. It can swap or ‘reassort’ genetic materials and merge, thereby resulting in a new subtype different from the parent viruses. These highly pathogenic viruses crossbred with human influenza, would be transmissible from humans to humans by airborne droplets, driven by coughs and sneezes resulting in a human pandemic. At present, no vaccines have been developed to combat HPAI. Even if vaccines were developed, it would take months to produce sufficient doses to protect the entire population of India. In the absence of an effective vaccine to combat avian flu, there is an extremely high possibility of human pandemic in South Asia.

Despite the lethality of avian influenza, India has been able to contain the outbreaks so far. However, the recurrence of the pandemic (four outbreaks of bird flu among poultry in 14 out of the West Bengal’s 19 districts in less than a year) is a cause for concern. Another is that within West Bengal, ducks are not culled. “Ducks have become reservoirs of the virus because they carry it without developing symptoms or falling sick. Infected ducks pose a threat not only to other animals but also humans,” said N.K. Ganguly, distinguished biotechnology fellow, Government of India, and scientific adviser to the Ministry of Health.

The task of eradicating H5N1 virus is a difficult and an expensive task. However, avian flu can be contained if the poultry industry is adequately overhauled and new surveillance systems are placed to detect bird flu outbreaks. Constant alert and hard work could play a vital role in combating avian influenza. This is one battle that India and the rest of Asia cannot afford to lose.

References

1 “New death from bird flu in China,” BBC News, January 19, 2009 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7836791.stm (Accessed on January 19, 2009).

2 James Reynolds, “China alert over bird flu death,” BBC News, January 7, 2009 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7815872.stm7 January 2009 (Accessed on January 7, 2009).

3 “West Bengal reports fresh bird flu outbreak,” The Economic Times at January 3, 2009
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/PoliticsNationWest_Bengal_reports_fr... bird_flu_outbreak/ articleshow/3931856.cms (Accessed on January 4, 2009).

4 “More deaths delay mop-up-6000 chickens die in Gajole block in one week, blood samples sent for tests,” The Telegraph, December 20, 2008 at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081220/jsp/siliguri/story_10278171.jsp (Accessed on December 20, 2008).

5 “4.3 lakh birds culled in Assam: Minister,” The Times of India, January 7, 2009 at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/43_lakh_birds_culled_in_Assam_Ministe... (Accessed on January 7, 2009).

6 See Kounteya Sinha, “Bird flu spreads to Tripura,” The Times of India, April 8, 2008, at http://
www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com /India/Bird_flu_spreads_to_Tripura_/articleshow/2933797.cms
(Accessed on April 8, 2008) and “Bird-flu detected in 17 villages along Tripura-

Bird Flu The Emerging Biological Weapons Threat and Proliferation January-March 2009 Sudha Raman

Military Utility

The Motives and the Problems

India and Biological Weapons Convention

Assessment and Options

• 1. “Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases”, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Refer www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp
• 2. Wendy Barnaby, The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare (London: Vision Paperbacks,1999), chapter 5 & 6.
• 3. Refer Simon M. Whity, Biological Warfare Against Crops, New York: Palgrave, 2002 and Terrance M. Wilson, Linda Logan-Henfrey, Richard Weller and Barry Keliman, “Agro Terrorism, Biological Crimes and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture”, in Corie Brown and Carole Bolin eds., Emerging Diseases of Animals , Washington D.C.: ASM Press, 2000, pp.23-57.
• 4. Robert A Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996), p.71-72. Also, Assessment of Impact of Chemical and Biological Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010: A Summary Report, Mclean, Vaz Booz, Allen and Hamilton, November 1997).
• 5. This is ignored in many studies undertaking for these weapons. Richard Novick and Seth Shulman, “New forms of Biological Warfare”, in Preventing a Biological Arms Race.
• 6. Ibid.
• 7. Gregory Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare”, International Security, Vol.28, No.3, Winter 2003-04, p.87.
• 8. P.R. Chari, “Bioterrorism and the Future”, in P.R. Chari and Arpit Rajain, Biological Weapons: Terrorism, Issues and Threats.
• 9. Kendall Hoyt and Stephen Brooks, “A Double-Edged Sword:Globalization and Biosecurity”, International Security, Vol.28, No.3 (Winter 2003-04), pp.123- 148.
• 10. Oliver Meier, “Biological Weapons Convention must Prevail”, Defence News, August 27 - September 7, 2001.
• 11. Statement of US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker, quoted in Brad Knickerbocker, “In an age of biowarfare, US sees new role for nukes”, The Christian
  Science Monitor, November 26, 2002. www.csmonitor.com/2002/1126/p02s02-usmi.htm
• 12. Michael J. Powers and Jonathan Ban, “Bio-Terrorism: Threat and Preparedness”, The Bridge, Vol.32, No.1 (Spring 2002).
• 13. “Bin Laden Group Has deadly Weapons”, The Indian Express, April 20, 1999.
• 14. Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2001-2002, p.83.
• 15. A Study on WMD undertaken by the USI.
• 16. Recommendations of the Group of Ministers, Reforming the National Security System, February 2001, p.114.
• 17. Statement of Arundhati Ghose at a seminar on ‘Biological Weapons Convention & Terrorism’ held on November 12, 2001, mentioned in P.R. Chari & Suba Chandran, ed., Bio-Terrorism and Bio-Defence (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), p.21.
• 18. Statement made by Arundhati Ghose to the Fourth Review Conference.
• 19. Statement made by Rakesh Sood, Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament at the 57th Session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on October 7, 2002.
• 20. Christopher Chyba, Biological Terrorism, Emerging Diseases and National Security (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund Project on World Security, 1998). http://rbf.org/publications/sec.html in Chyba and Alex Greninger, “Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World”, Survival, Vol.46, No.2 (Summer 2004), pp.143-162.
• 21. C. Raja Mohan, “Nuclear Comand Authority Comes Into Being: No-first Use; Retaliation will be Massive”, The Hindu, January 5, 2003.
• 22. William J. Broad, “In a Lonely Stand, a Scientist takes on National Security Dogma”, The New York Times, June 29, 2004.
• 23. Michael J. Powers and Jonathan Ban, “Bio-Terrorism: Threat and Preparedness”, The Bridge, Vol.32, No.1 (Spring 2002).

Biological Weapons, Biological Warfare, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), Terrorism Violence in Pakistan: Trend Analysis December 2008 January 31, 2009 T. Khurshchev Singh, Alok Bansal

Amidst apprehensions of a conflict between India and Pakistan after attacks on Mumbai on 26 November, as Pakistani security forces ostensibly diverted their attention from the Western to the Eastern borders, terror related violence showed an increase from 372 in November to 388 in December. Although there was no movement of troops from the Western borders to the East, Pakistani security forces allowed vast tracts of land in FATA and Swat Valley go under the control of Taliban. This was probably an attempt to put pressure on the West in the aftermath of Mumbai attacks, but only helped the militants to consolidate their position. As a result besides South and North Waziristan Agencies, the Taliban has established its writ in Orakzai Agency and Swat Valley.

As the security forces scaled down their operations against the militants, the causality figure of militants reduced significantly from 462 in November to 216 in December. Absence of any major military operations also ensured that the casualties of the security forces also reduced considerably from 56 in November to 23 in December. However, the casualties of civilians rose from 286 in November to 340 in December, as the militants utilized this breather to settle scores with pro-government tribal leaders and secular political activists. Nevertheless, the total number of deaths from violence came down from 804 in November to 579 in December, but it would be wrong to discern a durable trend from it as the reduced casualties were mainly because the security forces reduced military operations against the militants. In keeping with the militants’ policy of intimidating and in some instances eliminating allies of the government as well as those who dared to oppose their diktats, the number of abductions rose sharply from 65 in November to 271 in December.

NWFP

The continuing trend of the last three months demonstrates that the NWFP witnesses the highest number of violent attacks in Pakistan. The number of violent incidents decreased from 184 in November to 178 in December, averaging almost six a day. During the month of December 307 people were killed and 209 injured as against 342 killed and 308 injured in the previous month. However, the number of injured are likely to be higher as the exact number of injured were often not reported in the media. 100 alleged militants were killed during the month as against 190 killed and 123 injured in November. The security forces arrested 248 alleged militants including 109 persons from Hangu on December 30 for their alleged involvement in sectarian violence during Muharram. On the other hand 191 civilians were killed and 172 received injuries in December, as against 111 killed and 157 injured in November. Similarly, the number of people kidnapped by the militants has also increased to 70 in December from 32 the previous month including seven security personnel kidnapped in December and three in November. During the month of November,16 security personnel were killed and 36 injured as against 41 killed and 28 injured the previous month, thereby clearly indicating a marked lull in the security forces’ operations against the militants.

Like in the past, the main targets of the militants remained security posts, police stations, schools and shops selling CDs, wine and cosmetics. However, during the month of November, the supply convoys to NATO troops in Afghanistan were added to this list. In the biggest assault ever on this vital military supply line, over 300 vehicles and container vehicles that carry goods from Pakistan for NATO troops in Afghanistan were destroyed. On 7 December, the Taliban torched more than 160 vehicles carrying NATO vehicles in Peshawar and the very next day, they again torched another 53 in Peshawar destined for NATO forces in Afghanistan. The impunity, with which the attackers could target these high value targets in the heart of Peshawar city is indicative of state complicity. It appears that the security establishment in Pakistan wanted to use these attacks to ease US pressure being put on Pakistan to act against the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack. The strife between Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other tribal groups remained unabated and its cadres beheaded two followers of a rival cleric - Pir Samiullah in Gwalerai area of Matta tehsil. Militants operating in the restive Swat valley announced a unilateral ceasefire during Eid-ul-Azha. On 26 December, the Taliban in Swat district imposed a blanket ban on female education and warned the teachers of ‘severe consequences’. The militants also shot and injured a Chinese engineer and his security guard in Dargai on 24 December.

As against six suicide bombing in November, there were only three such attacks in December in NWFP, but they resulted in greater casualties. As opposed to 28 people killed and 53 wounded in November in NWFP, 56 persons were killed and 71 injured in suicide attacks in December. Two of the three attacks were directed against the security forces and the third attack was at a polling station set up for a by-election in Bunir district.

FATA

Unlike the other parts of Pakistan, there was an increase in the incidents of violence in FATA, which rose from 108 in November to 122 in December. However the casualty rates dropped significantly and against 337 killed and 109 injured in November, 201 persons were killed and 125 injured in December. 100 militants were killed and 63 injured in December as against 254 killed and 68 injured in the previous month. The security forces also arrested 31 alleged militants including Al Qaeda members as compared to 88 in November. Similarly, 87 civilian were killed and 31 injured as against 111 killed and 57 injured in the previous month. Besides, 185 (including 160 persons who were taken hostage by rival tribes in Kurram Agency on 16 December) civilians were kidnapped by the gunmen as against 23 in November. In the absence of any major operation by the security forces, only four security personnel lost their lives in the region as against eight in November. Besides, 15 security personnel were injured and one was kidnapped.

During the month of December as the security forces halted their operations against the militants, the interregnum was utilized by the militants to exterminate a number of alleged US spies. At least nine such ‘spies’ were killed in five different incidents in North and South Waziristan itself. Each dead body carried a note accusing them of spying for the US. Around four hundred alleged Taliban surrendered to the authorities during the month mainly in Mohmand agency. In accordance with the trend observed in NWFP, lorries and tankers carrying supplies for International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan were attacked while passing through the Khyber Pass and the TTP claimed responsibility for these attacks.

The region also witnessed one suicide attack in December as against two such incidents in November. On December 5, seven tribesmen were killed and eight others injured when a suicide bomber blew up an explosive-laden vehicle near a Jirga between Baramadkhel and Utmankhel tribes in Kalaya, the headquarters of Orakzai Agency. The tribes had joined anti-Taliban tribal militias set up by the security forces.

Balochistan

The number of incidents in Balochistan remained constant at 30, but the casualties dropped significantly. Barring isolated incidents, the ceasefire announced by the three Baloch nationalist outfits was adhered to in September. During the month, 11 persons were killed and 17 wounded in violent incidents as against 40 killed and 27 injured in November. Only two militants were killed in December as against 12 killed and 15 injured the previous month. However, security forces arrested 40 alleged militants as against 17 in November. Eight civilians were killed and 17 injured as against 23 killed and 11 injured in November. Besides, 14 persons were kidnapped as against two in November. Similarly, only one security personnel was killed during the month as against five killed and one injured in November. Most of the attacks during the month were on pipelines and railway lines, besides a few attacks on security posts.

Other Areas

Terror activities in other parts of the Pakistan remained at more or less the same level as in November. There were 58 incidents of violence in December as compared to 60 in November. 60 people lost their lives and 22 were injured in December as against 49 killed and 176 wounded in November. In December, 14 armed miscreants were killed and 96 arrested as against six killed and 37 arrested in November. Similarly, 44 civilians were killed and 20 injured in December as against 41 killed and 175 wounded in November. Two security personnel were also killed and two injured in December as against two killed and one injured in the previous month.

A number of political activists of PPP and MQM were killed in a number of incidents between 16 to 19 December in Karachi. In the recent past, criminal activities and violence in Karachi have shot up. In response a joint team of Sindh Police and Pakistan Rangers arrested more than 60 suspects, including Afghan nationals on 2 December and recovered a huge quantity of arms, ammunition. Besides Karachi, in a major crack down, the Islamabad police foiled terrorist attacks planned during Christmas, Benazir Bhutto’s death anniversary and the New Year’s Eve by seizing 650 kilograms of explosives and 520 detonators on December 26. Similarly, on December 30, Police in Lahore recovered a gas cylinder packed with 10-kilograms of improvised explosive device (IED) connected to a cell phone and a detonator from bushes.

Conclusion

There has been a significant decrease in violence in Pakistan that can be attributed to the reduced operations by security forces and a carte blanche given to militants after the attacks on Mumbai. TTP volunteered to fight against India along side the Pakistani army and Baitullah Mehsud declared on December 24, “Despite our differences with the government, the protection of Pakistan and its people is as much our duty as it is of the armed forces” and claimed that ‘hundreds of thousands of suicide bombers’ were ready to defend Pakistan in case of war with India. He further added, “The armed forces and the nation do not need to worry about the western borders in case of an Indian attack”. These statements were meant to win the support of the Pakistani public and prove his patriotic credentials and succeeded in its aims to a large extent.

Casualties in Violence - Pakistan
December 2008

Figure in parenthesis are the figures for the month of November

South Asia Swat, Balochistan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Trend Analysis, Pakistan Bhasha Dam: A Tomb Stone of Gilgit-Baltistan’s Aspirations January 31, 2009 Priyanka Singh, Alok Bansal

This year Pakistan is facing an acute water shortage and the shortage during the current Rabi crop is estimated to be around 35 to 40 per cent, which will adversely affect the wheat output, critical for the country’s food security. Pakistan also faces an acute power shortage, which has exacerbated by the reduced outflow from Tarbela Dam. To tide over the problems, Pakistan is building Bhasha Dam on River Indus, which is the largest dam being built in Pakistan since Tarbela was completed in 1976. Continuous silting has reduced the storage capacity of Tarbela and Mangla dams considerably. It had been estimated that to tide over the problems of Pakistan’s water shortages it needed to build a dam of Tarbela’s size (world’s largest rock filled dam) every seven years. However, political discord and lack of clear vision among Pakistan’s ruling elite have prevented even a single dam from being constructed during the last three decades. For a country where agriculture contributes one fifth of the national GDP and employs over 40 percent of the labour force, it could be a costly oversight.

The experts opine that the ideal site for building a mega dam in Pakistan is Kalabagh, which could provide millions of acres feet of water for irrigation in addition to cheap electricity. Though Punjab, the most populous province of Pakistan has always been supportive of Kalabagh, the other three provinces have been resolutely opposed to it. Although Sindh is opposed to any dam on Indus, NWFP feels that a dam at Kalabagh will inundate large agricultural tracts as well as the thriving city of Nowshera. Inspite of being small, NWFP has always wielded considerable influence on the security establishment of Pakistan and it was therefore impossible for the then military rulers to overlook its objections. Despite General Musharraf’s fervent attempts, a consensus eluded Kalabagh. In fact Asfandar Wali Khan, the ANP leader, went to the extent of asking him to chose between Kalabagh Dam and the federation.

As a result Musharraf in the year 2006, settled for less ‘contentious’ Bhasha Dam to be built as the first mega dam as part of his ‘Water Vision 2025’, which envisages building at least five dams across Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK). The site of the proposed Bhasha dam is located on the Indus River 314 kilometres upstream of Tarbela dam and about 120 km downstream of its confluence with the Gilgit River. Its proponents claim that it could enhance the lifespan of Tarbela dam; by reducing silting. It is also expected to have a longer life span than Kalabagh as the sediment load at Bhasha is considerably lower than at Kalabagh. The construction is expected to start by September 2009 and is estimated to cost a whopping $ 12 billion.

The dam is slated to have 12 power generating units of 375 MW capacity and the average annual hydel power to be generated by the dam is estimated to be 19,000 GWH. The dam with a height of 272 m,will be the highest roller-compacted concrete dam in the world. There will be 14 gates of 11.0 x 16.5 m size. The gross capacity of the dam will be 7.3 Million Acre Feet (MAF) and the live (usable) capacity of the dam will be 6.4 MAF. A number of roads need to be built to provide access to the project site and the funding requirement has been forecast as Rs 31 billion, however, only Rs 2.6 billion have been provided in the budget for the current financial year. For the project a meagre sum of Rs 200 million has been assigned in the budget and the bulk of funding was expected from the World Bank and the ADB. However, the World Bank has refused to fund the dam or any other project in POK. Moreover, with the global economic slowdown, funding from any international multilateral organisation may become a serious problem and may further slowdown the already slow progress of the project.

However, the dam will not only take much longer January 2009 5 to build, it will inundate large tracts of land in Gilgit-Batistan. Besides it would also inundate 120 Kilometre stretch of Karakoram Highway, which links China with Pakistan and provides the main access to this otherwise inaccessible region. The dam is therefore strongly opposed by the local population but the hapless population of Gilgit-Baltistan, without any representation in Islamabad’s policy making institutions, has no avenue of getting its voice heard in Islamabad. The local population already has serious grievances against the Pakistan government for the continuing ‘oppression,’ for the last six decades. The government has not only not allowed the people any say in the decision making process, it has even prevented them from forming unions.

The dam has grave socio-economic and environmental implications. It will displace the residents from at least 32 villages in Diamer District as soon the construction work starts. The large tracts of fertile land, which is extremely scarce in Gilgit- Baltistan will get inundated, making the region even more dependent on Pakistan for its food requirements. The construction will bring in large number of workers from outside the region. As it is the State Subjects Rule, which prevented outsiders from acquiring land in the region has been done away with, consequently, the migrants have been settling in the region and altering the unique ethnic composition of the region. The dam may further disturb the already delicate ethnic and sectarian balance in the region. The construction of a huge reservoir in a tectonic faultline may result in serious ecological complications. The recurrence of a massive earthquake like the one experienced in the Mirpur-Muzaffarabad region of POK in 2005, could lead to severe calamity as a breach in a huge reservoir like Bhasha Dam could inundate most of the cities located downstream on the banks of Indus.

The fundamental problem with the dam is that while almost the entire inundation will take place in Gilgit-Baltistan, the power plant will be located in Bhasha in NWFP and hence it will receive the royalty from the power generation.Although the entire water in the reservoir will be available for irrigation down stream in Pakistan, not even an acre of land will be irrigated in so called ‘Northern Areas’ (Gilgit-Baltistan). As a sop to the local population the name of the dam was changed from Bhasha to Diamer-Bhasha to give them a false sense of ownership and it was announced that the royalty will be shared with the ‘Northern Areas’. However, NWFP government has refused to share the royalty and Pakistani constitution supports their contention. The provision in the constitution states that the royalty would go to the state where the powerhouse for generating electricity is located. However, this is not a valid justification for the NWFP to reap the benefits of royalty from the dam, as the constitution of Pakistan does not apply to Gilgit-Baltistan, where the dam is actually located.

There is another dimension of this dam that needs to be highlighted and it is related to the preservation of archaeological assets. In April 2008, there were reports that approximately one thousand rare stone carvings, sculptures and statues of Buddha were discovered at the construction site of the dam. Pakistan as a signatory to international conventions is obliged to protect these heritage sites.

However,obliterating the region’s pre-Islamic past may suit Pakistan’s political and ideological objectives, but India’s reticence is baffling. The dam is being built in a territory that legally belongs to India and the population of the region, who are ‘de jure’ citizens of India are being persecuted to facilitate its construction. The Government of India must raise its voice against persecution of its citizens. It will be difficult for Pakistan to obtain funding for the project, if India educates the international multilateral organisations about the illegality of the project and consequent violation of the basic human rights of the population of Gilgit-Baltistan. Its unique ethnonationalist character and pristine environment is being threatened to provide irrigation and electricity to Pakistan, without any concurrence of the local population or India.

(Commentary originally published in January issue of POK News Digest.)

South Asia Bhasha Dam, Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan Indus Water Treaty: Zardari ups the ante on Water Issues January 30, 2009 Arvind Gupta

In an article published by Washington Post on January 28, 2009, Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari hinted that Pakistan regards water as a major issue in bilateral relations with India. The article, titled “Partnering with Pakistan,” was a plea to US President Obama to continue to recognize Pakistan’s role in the US’ war on terrorism and regional stability. But Zardari did not miss the opportunity to make a mention of the water. He wrote:

“The water crisis in Pakistan is directly linked to relations with India. Resolution could prevent an environmental catastrophe in South Asia, but failure to do so could fuel the fires of discontent that lead to extremism and terrorism. We applaud the president’s desire to engage our nation and India to defuse the tensions between us”.

This passage in the article clearly conveys that Pakistan holds India responsible for the “water crisis” in Pakistan. Zardari wants to involve the US and the international community in the resolution of water issues between India and Pakistan. He is also warning that if the water issue remains unresolved, it could lead to intensification of extremism and terrorism.

President Zardari’s latest outburst should be seen as a continuation of his public statements in October 2008 in which he had alleged that India was interfering with the flow of river Chenab’s water in violation of the Indus Water Treaty between the two countries. According to media reports quoting Zardari, the issue was taken up by him with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly and also with the Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad. Zardari alleged on that occasion that the diversion of water by India from the Chenab river was causing agricultural losses in Lahore, Kasur, Okara, Sialkot, Hafizabad, Shekhupura, Faisalabad and Jhang districts in Pakistan. The issue had also reportedly been discussed by the National Security Advisers of the two countries. A delegation of Pakistani officials led by the Pakistani Indus Water Commissioner Jamat Ali Shah visited India to inspect the Baglihar dam project. Pakistan is seeking compensation from India for the diversion of water.

What is the water “issue” between India and Pakistan? The two countries signed the Indus Water Treaty in 1960 with the help of World Bank’s mediation. Despite several wars and crises between India and Pakistan, the Treaty has been hailed as a shining example of cooperation between two states on water-sharing. India never stopped the flow of water to Pakistan even during the height of India-Pakistan wars.

India and Pakistan share six rivers of the Indus basin, grouped into two categories – the Western Rivers (the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum) and the Eastern Rivers (Sutlej, Ravi and Beas). Under the Indus Water Treaty, India has complete right to the use of the waters of the Eastern Rivers while Pakistan has the right to use the waters of the Western Rivers. The Treaty and its annexures are detailed technical documents which contain the restrictions on the usage of the waters. For instance, Pakistan can use the waters of the Western Rivers but India can also use them for irrigation purposes. India is also allowed to build run–of–the- river dams on the Western Rivers. The Treaty also permits India to store 3.5 million acre feet of water. The fact is that India has so far not constructed any storage projects on the Western Rivers. The people of Jammu and Kashmir have demanded abrogation of the Treaty as it restricts the use of the Western River waters which flow through their state.

Whatever Pakistan might say, the Treaty is extraordinarily generous to Pakistan. Of the total water carried in the six rivers, 80 per cent flows through the Western Rivers and only 20 per cent through the Eastern Rivers. Thus, Pakistan gets over 4/5th of the Indus basin water.

Under the Treaty, the two countries have set up an Indus Water Commission which is a body of engineers from both sides who are entrusted with the task of implementing the Treaty in letter and spirit. The Indus Water Commission has been holding regular meetings since the inception of the Treaty. The officials of the two sides regularly exchange technical information with regard to the flow of water from the rivers, construction of projects etc.

Pakistan has often used the provisions of the Treaty to raise objections to the projects proposed by the Indian side and permitted under the Treaty. The Treaty has been used by Pakistan to obstruct and delay the projects allowed under the Treaty on the Western Rivers. The latest example is that of the Baglihar Dam constructed by India on the river Chenab and commissioned in 2008. Pakistan objected to the design of the dam holding that it was contrary to the provisions of the Treaty. Pakistan took the case to the “Neutral Expert” appointed by the World Bank in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty to go into the objections. The neutral expert gave a ruling upholding the soundness of the Indian design and suggested some minor changes. The dam was, commissioned eventually but after an avoidable delay of four years as a result of Pakistan’s objections.

Another project that has been held up due to Pakistani intransigence is the Tulbul Barrage which involves the construction of a barrage at the Wular Lake to improve local navigation. The project will also help Pakistan as it would ensure the flow of water to Pakistan in the lean season. But Pakistan continues to block the project ignoring the benefits that will accrue to both sides. There are many such examples of Pakistan’s obstructionist attitude.

The Pakistani propaganda on the water issue is aimed at projecting India as a country which is exploiting the river waters of the Indus basin to the detriment of Pakistan. Several Pakistan based terrorist groups have also linked water with jihad in Kashmir. The former “Prime Minister” of the so called “Azad Jammu & Kashmir” Sardar Sikander Hayat used to say clearly, “the freedom fighters of Kashmir are in reality fighting for Pakistan’s water security and have prevented India from constructing a dam on the Wular Barrage”.1

Pakistan’s propaganda must be responded to. The fact is that the Indus Water Treaty is generous to a fault to Pakistan. It is unlikely that if the Indus Water Treaty were to be negotiated, Pakistan would get a better deal than what it got in 1960. With water becoming a critical issue in India’s relations with Pakistan and also with China, India has to evolve a well considered strategy aimed at securing its national interest and at the same time minimizing the potential for conflict with neighbours.

By raising the water issue at this juncture Pakistan is trying to deflect international attention from Pakistan-based terrorism and instead rekindling the international community’s interest in Kashmir.

India should recognize that Pakistan is upping the ante and trying to make water an “issue” between the two countries. India should call Pakistan’s bluff and suggest renegotiation of the treaty in line with current political, economic, environmental and geo-political realities. That will test Pakistan’s sincerity about “resolving’ the water issue between the two countries. In the meanwhile, India should go ahead with the construction of the Tulbul barrage in the knowledge that it is a win - win project which will pass muster of a neutral expert if Pakistan decides to take it to the World Bank. Likewise, India should build the Kishenganga dam, to which it is entitled. India should also identify storage projects which are in accordance with the Treaty provisions. India should urgently plug the leakage of water flowing to Pakistan through the Eastern Rivers on whose waters it has complete right under the Treaty. While India should favour cooperation over conflict in its relations with Pakistan, it should not let itself be pressured by Pakistan unjustifiably over water related issues.

South Asia India, India-Pakistan Relations, Indus Water Treaty, Pakistan Indo-US Missile Defence Cooperation: Hype or Happening? January 30, 2009 A. Vinod Kumar

In early January 2009, the Financial Times reported “preliminary talks” between US and India on possible sale of systems for an Indian ballistic missile defence (BMD) shield. The daily quoted US embassy officials in New Delhi as saying that technical talks had taken place and that US defence officials had conducted computer simulations with Indian counterparts to demonstrate the capabilities of this technology. The Indian media, and some foreign ones, picked up the story and projected the report as an impending US-India deal on missile defence cooperation. That the report came amidst heightened tensions between India and Pakistan fuelled further speculation.

However, a closer look at the report indicates media hype rather than actual substance. As the FT report suggests, talks and technical-level interaction has been taking place between the Indian and US defence establishments for the past two years, and much earlier, to explore possibilities of cooperation in ballistic missile defence. Missile defence was one of the potential areas for strategic partnership identified in the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in January 2004. Since then, concerned departments in the Pentagon and South Block have been discussing the means by which both countries can partner in this area. However, what puzzled BMD watchers was how such partnership would mould as US and India are placed at diametrically opposite ends of the BMD technological spectrum. The US is striving to develop advanced BMD technologies for mid-course and exo-atmospheric (outside the Earth’s atmosphere) interception with multiple kill-vehicle technologies including laser systems, while India is still struggling with rudimentary air defence technologies, notwithstanding the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) plans for an indigenous BMD system.

Though ‘cooperation’ remains the buzzword, it is unclear on whether this would amount to technology development or transfer, or off-the-shelf purchases of US systems by India. Soon after the FT report, a Pentagon spokesman denied any talks on sale of BMD systems. Rather, there are vague inferences on technical cooperation, which most in all likelihood could be centred on US ‘assistance’ to Indian BMD experimentations. A Pentagon statement clarifies that Indian scientists were invited to their test facilities – where a series of development tests are being undertaken by the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) on systems like the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defence System (GBMDS) and the Airborne Laser (ABL), among others. How far would such interactions lead to a concrete ‘partnership’ is something which cannot be speculated at this point. There are many reasons for this ambivalence.

First, Indian BMD experimentations are progressing rapidly after the DRDO convinced the government on its ability to develop BMD technology, despite the jinxed state of many Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) ventures. The agency surprised many when it declared in late 2006 the development of a BMD capability through its Prithvi Air Defence Experiment (PADE). After all, achieving precision interception in a first attempt invites astonishment as even advanced countries like US and Russia have struggled on this technology for decades. The DRDO repeated the feat in December 2007 by declaring ‘successful’ tests of its (Prithvi Air Defence) PAD and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) systems. The PAD was touted as an exo-atmospheric system with 50km range (though an exo-atmospheric system should have the range of over 100 km) while the AAD was to be a lower-tier air defence system at 15-25 km range, which incidentally was also the capability aspired by the Akash. With a development and deployment target for middle of next decade, the DRDO is confident of an indigenous BMD shield, and could have convinced the government to reject plans for external acquisitions.

Second, as many media reports suggest, outright acquisitions from US comes with concomitant political sensitivities. China and Pakistan would be annoyed by the presence of US BMD systems in India, which would negate the deterrence capability of their nuclear arsenals, just like the GBMDS in Eastern Europe affecting Russia’s deterrence calculus. Being under pressure from the East European BMD and proliferation of US theatre defence systems in East Asia, China would make a hue and cry if India deploys US BMD systems as a shield against Chinese missiles, supposedly deployed in Tibet and other military regions. The FT report quoted an unnamed Pakistani official as saying that Pakistan “will have to take counter-measures to respond” to any agreement between the US and India on missile defence.

Though it is exactly these two catalysts that warrant an Indian BMD shield, it is unlikely that New Delhi would intimidate its adversaries by acquiring US BMD systems. However, Indian planners feel that these two nuclear neighbours would not be bewildered over an indigenous Indian system or acquisition of Russian systems like the S-300 or S-400. After all, China is known to be reverse-engineering Russian theatre systems like the S-75 and S-300 to develop its own air defence variants like the FT-2000 and the Hongqi. Despite its prowess in missile technologies, China’s capabilities on BMDs are underdeveloped. Though China watchers feel something dramatic is to come. One could anticipate China rattling the world with a major BMD demonstration, just as it did with the anti-satellite test.

Third, the scope for US partnership with India on BMD technology development is limited. Besides the DRDO’s zealousness for indigenisation, the US would be unwilling to share inputs on advanced baseline interception technologies on which the MDA is struggling to carve out a niche. It is often felt that the only technology US would be willing to share is the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) system, which is an air defence system manned by the US Army. One should remember that the US had turned down Israel’s request to transfer the Arrow-II (a US-Israel joint venture) to India, despite it being an endo-atmospheric (range within Earth’s atmosphere) system, though it agreed to transfer the Greepine Radar. Considering that Washington developed cold feet on transferring even an advanced theatre defence system, it is difficult to envisage a US-India partnership on developing an Indian BMD system, which should naturally entail development of longer-range capabilities for boost or mid-course interception.

This being the milieu, it should be noted that even the US BMD programme is in crisis amidst budgetary constrains placed by the U.S. Congress and concerns that the Obama administration might terminate some existing projects. After more than a decade of development efforts, the MDA is still struggling to deploy its flagship project – the GBMDS. But for the limited deployment in Alaska, the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) and its support systems are still undergoing development tests, with that still elusive final ‘precision hit’. A similar fate hangs on projects like the ABL, which has to prove its worth in a crucial flight test later this year.

However, the MDA had its own morale-booster when the Aegis BMD (integrated on Aegis destroyers) shot down a dysfunctional satellite over Earth’s atmosphere in February 2008. Australia and Japan are acquiring the Aegis, which is currently the only operational mid-course/early ascent interception system. This implies that even India can aspire for this system if US-India BMD cooperation actually fructifies. However, the strategic relationship has not graduated to such levels of military partnering that would convince Washington to share its naval BMD mainstay with a country with whom relations are tumultuous.

Such scepticism, however, does not completely freeze the possibilities of cooperation in missile defence. A DRDO-MDA tie-up on knowledge sharing and capacity development is a possibility. The DRDO could benefit from the know-how on support infrastructure including surveillance, early warning and targeting systems, which are less controversial. After all, the PAD experiment was undertaken with formidable coverage from the Greenpine radar. Another system that could raise few tempers is the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system, which has higher endo-atmospheric coverage and is being deployed by the US Army as an augmentation to the Patriot. Assuming that New Delhi might have declined the Patriot system in place of its request for Arrow-II, it could convince Washington to transfer the THAAD, which is capable of tackling threats from short-range Chinese missiles in Tibet and Pakistani IRBMs.

However, with little information on the confabulations between the two countries on BMD cooperation, such speculation would only satiate beat reporters. Nonetheless, Washington could use this opportunity to signal out to Moscow with which Pentagon interlocutors are having a tough time convincing Russia on the merits of an East European BMD system. For that matter, Washington is also aware of the fact that Moscow had offered BMD partnership to New Delhi well before Indo-US ties blossomed.

Nuclear and Arms Control India-US Relations, Defence Cooperation, Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Learning from the American Experience in Counter Terrorism January 30, 2009 Arvind Gupta

It has been widely noted that the US has not suffered a terrorist attack since 9/11. This is because it undertook major reform of its homeland security structures following the 9/11 attacks. India could learn from the wide ranging CT reform in the US after 9/11 and adopt measures suitable in the Indian context.

Legal measures

The first step taken by the US president and the Congress after 9/11 was to pass a wide ranging tough anti-terrorism law, the USA PATRIOT (Providing All the Tools Required for Intercepting and Obstructing Terrorism) Act 2001, which vastly increased the powers of the law enforcement agencies in the areas of surveillance, detention, regulation of financial transactions, detention and deportation of immigrants, collection of intelligence etc. It also expanded the definition of terrorism to include domestic terrorism. The act has a number of provisions to prevent money laundering and to disrupt the financing of terrorism. The Act particularly focuses on foreign entities, individuals and jurisdictions. The law has been criticized in the US for curtailing civil liberties but the Congress went ahead and approved it. The Patriot Act provides the basis of counter terrorism activities of the law enforcement agencies.

The PATRIOT Act increases the ability of law enforcement agencies to listen to telephonic conversations, search e-mail communications, medical, financial and other records. It eases restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the United States; expands the authority of the Treasury Secretary to regulate financial transactions, particularly those involving foreign individuals and entities; and enhances the discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities in detaining and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorism-related acts.

Department of Homeland security

The US effort has been directed towards integrating the activities of the multiple scattered agencies having any connection with internal security. Thus, in 2002, the US created a separate Department of Homeland Security by an Act which created an overarching federal entity responsible for the country’s internal security. The department was created by merging 22 different agencies having 166, 234 personnel and a budget of $40.7 billion. The department of homeland security is responsible for protecting the nation not just from terror attacks but also from natural and manmade emergencies. It is responsible for protecting the country from nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological attacks.

The department oversees and coordinates the activities of nearly 87,000 state and local level agencies or “jurisdictions” having security responsibilities.

The Homeland security department is necessarily large, given its ambitious mission. It has an annual budget of about $50.5 billion (year 2009). It brings under its umbrella the US Coast Guard, the US Transportation Security Administration, the US Citizenship and Immigration Services, the domestic nuclear detection office, the US Customs and Border Protection Service, the Federal Law Enforcement training centre, the US Secret Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and a host of other services. A large number of offices, directorates, advisory committess and councils have been created in the department for carrying out the coordination, planning work and to oversee implementation of plans.

Despite criticism that the Homeland Security Department is too large and unwieldy, it has achieved a lot since its creation. For instance, a Transport Security Administration has been created and equipped to do 100 per cent screening of airline passengers and check baggage. Maritime transportation system and cargo supply chain security has been enhanced through a number of initiatives like Containing Security Initiative. A domestic Nuclear Detection Centre has been created. Homeland Security Department’s various components have huge budgets. For instance, in 2007, $6 billion were spent on Transport and Security administration, $6.3 billion on Customs and Border Protection, $7 billion on US Coast Guard and $5.9 billion on Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The Department of Homeland Security has undertaken a number of critical projects to improve the safety and security of the nation. The specific ongoing projects of the Homeland Security Department include increasing the number of Border Patrol Agents, erecting a state-of-the-art fence on the border, improving the background check process for immigrants, improving the technologies for passenger and baggage screening, enhancing security assessments in respect of personnel working at the airports and ports, reinforcing maritime safety and security, enhancing the capabilities of US Computer Emergency Readiness Teams.

Intelligence

Following 9/11 attacks, the US undertook major reform of the intelligence community. It created a Directorate of National Intelligence which brings together all the 17 intelligence agencies under one umbrella – under the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI). The objective of the DNI is to create a seamless web of information out of the data-bases of various agencies and provide it to users, including those in the private sector, on the basis of need and utility and breaking the barriers between agencies. The DNI’s vision is a bold one but achievable. The main idea behind the DNI’s vision is to ensure that information is shared rapidly across the intelligence community and also with relevant agencies outside the intelligence community so that the active agencies have an edge over the terrorists. The DNI’s aim is to create a seamless integration of people, processes and technologies to achieve the sharing of information.

Counter Terrorism

The US has created a National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) which analyses the terrorist threats and shares this information with all the concerned agencies. The NCTC is the most important source of analysis as well as strategic operation plan for counter-terrorism. It coordinates its CT efforts with the CIA, FBI, Departments of State Defence and Homeland Security as well as specialist departments such as those of Energy, Treasury, Agriculture, Transportation, Health, Nuclear Regulatory Commission etc. NCTC officials chair inter-agency meetings to discuss emerging threats to US interests at home and abroad. Some of the specific things done by the NCTC are:

• It fuses all-source intelligence and makes it available to all agencies for their operations.
• It fuses federal, state, and local information and makes it available to all concerned.
• It has created threat assessment centres which make a picture of current threats to homeland security.
• It promotes the concept of joint-ness in the intelligence community.
• It has created infrastructure protection centres.
• It assigns responsibilities to different agencies for counter-terrorism (CT) operations.
• It carries out joint CT operations.
• It has the primary agency responsible for analysis and integration of information.
• It combines all instruments available for CT: diplomatic, military, financial, intelligence, homeland security, law enforcement etc.
• It produces warnings, alerts and advisories as well as analytic assessments on terrorism.
• It maintains a national data-base on terrorists.
• It manages a joint operations centre which provides situational awareness of terrorism-related issues developing worldwide.
• It provides information on terrorism to international partners.
• It develops, integrates implements strategic operational plans needed for the country’s counterterrorism activities.

India has been a victim of terrorism for a long time. India also has considerable experience in counterterrorism. A large number of agencies at the central and state level are engaged in counterterrorism activities of different kinds. Indian agencies routinely foil potential terrorism-related incidents. This is reflected in media reports about interception of RDX, busting of terrorist modules and encounters between the police and the terrorists. Unfortunately, as the Mumbai terrorist attacks have shown, Indian counterterrorism efforts are not sufficient to deter the highly motivated and innovative terrorists. The weakness in the Indian effort appears to be the relative lack of coordination amongst Indian intelligence, law enforcement and legal agencies. While the government has taken some steps to strengthen law enforcement by creating a National Investigation Agency (NIA), the coordination amongst multiple agencies is a serious problem which remains to be addressed. In the government departments the culture of information sharing does not exist.

The government needs to promote the culture of information sharing not only amongst the various agencies but also between the Central and the State agencies. The necessary infrastructure, using the latest information and communication technologies linking the different agencies at various levels needs to be created urgently. Information sharing, threat assessment and a risk-based approach to deal with these threats should become a norm rather than an exception. The government should be in a position to continuously indicate the level of threat that the country faces at any given point of time so that action can be taken by the concerned agencies without having to wait for any specific order from any agency.

The lack of political consensus on how to deal with terrorism hampers counter terrorism efforts. The government can learn from the experience of the US and other countries which have created effective counterterrorism agencies through unification and integration of CT efforts.

Terrorism & Internal Security Counter-Terrorism, Terrorism, United States of America (USA) Foregrounding ‘Non-Combatant Immunity’ January 30, 2009 Ali Ahmed

A fundamental principle of humanitarian law, non-combatant immunity, has been virtually consigned to history during the Bush years. To a large extent this can be considered a ‘success’ for terrorists. That terrorists do not respect the principle of non-combatant immunity is central to the definition of terrorism. The aim of terrorists is substantially achieved when states also adopt their language and grammar. This has been done to an extent by the US in its militarily aggressive response to 9/11 in Iraq and Afghanistan. With US inaction, Israel has gone farthest by violating the principle of non-combatant immunity in its just concluded attack on Gaza that claimed over 1300 lives, mostly civilian. In the American case, ‘military necessity’ has dictated targeting indicating that the principle of non-combatant immunity is taken seriously, but not always followed. Thus civilian casualties in operations outside Green Zones in Iraq, in particular spectacular ‘clear and hold’ operations such as Falluja, are treated as unintended ‘collateral damage’. Israel has, on the contrary, focused on civilian targets deliberately, in order to bolster deterrence and to punish the Palestinian population for its continued support to Hamas. Closer home in South Asia, non-combatants have been affected considerably in counter insurgency operations, be it in Nepal earlier or in continuing operations against the Tamil Tigers and in Swat and Bajaur of Pakistan.

While it is true that any historical survey would reveal that non-combatant immunity has seldom been conceded by warring armies, it is of equal import that the principle has been reinforced by religious, ethical and political commentary over the ages and in all cultures. Medieval religious wars did not respect this principle as the political aim was to proselytize. Siege warfare permitted the logistic shaping of the battlefield in cutting off supplies to the besieged populace. Revolutionary wars tapped the nationalist energy of the populations, thereby bringing in ‘people’ as combatants. Guerrilla wars enlarged the scope of people’s participation. Warfare accompanying these changes identified people in terms of their will as a way of imposing their ‘will’ over an enemy. Social Darwinism of the Nineteenth century presaged the Total Wars of the succeeding century in which the doctrine of ‘unconditional surrender’ ensured that civilians were identified with regimes being contested violently. The fire bombings, strategic bombing, concentration camps and the use of nuclear weapons were the culmination of this tendency in warfare. In the Cold War period, deterrence to which is attributed the ‘long peace’ - was based on holding adversary populations hostage. In areas peripheral to the central strategic balance, revolutionary wars, dubbed ‘peoples wars’ predominated. Vietnam and Afghanistan are the most illustrative cases of violations of non combatant status of affected populations. Asymmetric warriors of today assume they are not required to genuflect to this principle, because their political project is based on the terrorism-suppression-alienation cycle.

Civilian populations have also suffered disproportionately more than regimes from the imposition of sanctions purportedly designed to topple regimes. The classic examples are Iraq in the Nineties and Gaza over the last two years. Sanctions against Iran, and possibly a non-compliant Pakistan, are possible targets. Sanctions appear to be the strategic equivalent of ‘shaping the battle’. The population is punished for the actions of the ruling regime. This is precisely the logic of the terrorist. Islamists too identify Western people with their governments and in making that connection attempt to legitimize their tactic of targeting civilians. The logic of the Israelis ironically vindicates the Islamist position, for in democratic states, in theory the electorate has some control over the government actions. Therefore if actions of western governments are hostile, then in the Islamist narrative the population is to blame for being inert and culpable. The danger of this logic of conflating populations with their governments is the weakening of the immense strides made in human rights and humanitarian law post World War-II.

Another trend is the displacement of civilian populations due to military operations. Examples closer home are recent population movements in FATA-NWFP and in Sri Lanka in Killinochchi and Mullaitivu. While humanitarian emergencies have accompanied combat operations earlier, the lethality, firepower and shock effects have increased manifold. There is insufficient evidence to document the psychological effects of attacks by drones in the post heroic age. The political effects are more than evident in any case.

It would appear that non-combatant immunity has been more of an ideal than a fact. But the developments in the Charter era with the war crimes trials at Nuremberg and Japan, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions marking its early years have elevated non-combatant immunity from a principle to customary law status in the law of armed conflict. Treaty law has not kept pace in that the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 have not been acceded to yet by most states. There is thus a tension between state practice and this principle.

The aspect of accountability of the political head for the resulting human tragedy would deter mindless assaults and would facilitate the political plank in terms of resolution options. The International Criminal Court can be energized to pursue crimes of international concern such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Presently there are 108 signatories to the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the Court. India is not represented and nor is the USA. The deterrent effect would be substantial. For punishing violators of jus in bello retributive justice through International Criminal Tribunals and Special Courts should be pursued until the ICC gains traction. Justice meted out to Milosevic and Karadzic through the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia are examples. This would foster the notion of individualized guilt and would act as a deterrent for key political actors.

To obviate violations at the ground level, militaries would require factoring in civilian casualties from the beginning in the planning and preparation stage. The after-the-fact arrival of aid, under what passes now as Stabilisation Operations, is no longer enough, given population densities and numbers involved. This should dovetail military planning with execution carried out by civilian administrators in league with NGOs. This should form part of curricular innovation at staff colleges. The Disaster Management organizations in states can be co-opted to follow up to ameliorate conditions in conflict zones. This makes political sense in that it would facilitate peace in post conflict conditions. The example of Iraq indicates that the possibility of Asymmetric War in the aftermath of the conflict could be lessened. For this to happen targeting must be against military targets and needs of the affected populations should be met immediately to deal with advancing military forces. This insight is relevant for India that has adopted a Limited War strategy that may necessitate incursions into Pakistan held territory.

To the extent that tenets of international law are influenced, modified and eventually replaced by state practice, the principle of non-combatant immunity is endangered. The international community is responsible for pressuring the regime and ensuring compliance. In case it proves inadequate for the latter, there would be a convergence between terrorism and state terrorism, generating a self sustaining cycle in terms of violence and its legitimisation. This would add to the erosion suffered by the international order during the Bush years that resulted in illegal detention and rendition, preventive war and expansive interpretation of military necessity. These issues could be revisited, through perhaps an international conference. This will lend more urgency to the long neglected Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions dealing with protection of persons in both interstate and intra-state conflicts.

State practice, often determined by strategic considerations, would require taking into account the political benefits of occupying the moral high ground and the need to preempt the alienation-terrorism cycle. Human security concerns are not adequate to persuade states that operate in the dominant realist tradition. Where the political argument fails, as has been found repeatedly to be the case with Israel and the US, setting a precedent for coercing states to comply with norms is imperative. The opportunity offered by Israel’s targeting of the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) compound in Gaza should be seized to set up a war crimes investigation by the UN or the ICC, as suggested by the head of its Gaza operations, John Ging. While this is unlikely to dissuade Israel, it could impact calculations of future actors elsewhere. It would help refocus attention on peace making and conflict resolution.

Military Affairs Israel, Hamas, Gaza, Non-combatant Immunity, Terrorism, United States of America (USA) Obama’s Likely Policy Towards North East Asia January 29, 2009 Rajaram Panda

Expectations are high in Japan, both in the general public and amongst the elite, after Democrat Barack Obama’s ascendancy to the American Presidency. Japan was clearly uncomfortable with Republican Bush administration’s pursuit of a unilateralist foreign policy as against Obama’s more pronounced multilateral approach. According to Professor Kenji Takita of Chuo University, multilateralism is closely associated with smart power and therefore Obama’s shift towards multilateralism is likely to undo some of the damage that the Bush administration’s unilateralism has done to American standing. Obama’s rise to the presidency is likely to assuage the hurt feelings of some US allies who are likely to reorient their foreign and security policies.

And yet, contentious bilateral issues are likely to dominate Japan-US relations. This is not to say the security alliance that has remained the lynchpin of the bilateral relationship since the end of World War II will be undermined. On the contrary, the Japan-US strategic partnership will be reinforced under the Obama administration by weaving a web of larger and deeper institutional mechanisms lending greater robustness to the existing relationship.

Japan would like to seek a resolution to the abduction issue as well as denuclearization of North Korea. Japan is concerned that Obama will come under intense pressure to introduce protectionist trade policies to “defend” the US economy in the face of the current economic downturn.

It is unclear if Obama will downplay the US security relationship with Japan to mollify China, with which Obama might seek greater convergence of interests, mainly because of deepening economic ties and the need to engage China to keep it from projecting its great power ambitions. While the US-Japan security alliance is destined to remain in place, a robust Sino-US relationship under Obama will reinforce efforts towards creating a power equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific region. China is the largest holder of US national bonds, totaling $585 billion (as of September 2008), which means that it is China and not Japan that underwrites the US in financial terms.

Expectations are high because China has become an engine of growth, with its economy having grown at an average of 9.6 per cent a year for the last 30 years. The country now holds the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, which stands at $1.9 trillion. Japan is in second place, with slightly more than half that amount. The US and China are deeply interdependent in economic terms, though they may be wary about each other militarily. China holds roughly $1 trillion of $2 trillion in US foreign reserves. Japan will clearly feel uneasy if Obama reorients US foreign policy towards a China centric East Asia.

This is the concern that continues to lurk in the minds of the mandarins in Kasumigaseki. For the time being, Japan is upbeat in hearing that Joseph Nye is being sent by Obama as US ambassador to Japan. Nye has a huge reputation in Japan and is credited for his efforts to ‘redefine’ the US-Japan alliance after World War II and his contribution to adding teeth to the alliance relationship remains unparalleled. Also, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s observation on 13 January 2009 on the US-Japan alliance relationship will assuage any possible fear in the minds of the Japanese that Obama might drift US foreign policy priorities more towards China at the expense of Japan. Hillary Clinton said: “Our alliance with Japan is a cornerstone of American policy in Asia, essential to maintaining peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, and based on shared values and mutual interests”. Thus, it transpires that the current Japanese mood about the Obama administration is overtly optimistic.

Two issues might assume preponderance in the US-Japan relationship during the Obama presidency: First, the issue of sharing defence burden by Japan and Japan’s greater engagement with Obama’s multilateralism; and second, Japan’s contribution to resuscitate the global economy and how Japan can help salvage the US economy. As regards the first, Obama faces huge challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Palestine, tensions in India-Pakistan relations, and North Korea. Obama would need to mobilize its allies, such as Japan and South Korea, to resolve conflicts under the banner of multilateralism. Hillary Clinton would prefer to negotiate directly with North Korea and set her priorities to de-nuclearize North Korea, while Japan would want Clinton to take up the abduction issue. The Obama administration would be happy with Japan demonstrating greater self-reliance and autonomy in security affairs. Obama would expect greater contribution from Japan to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. This would involve greater burden-sharing and power-sharing. Second, economic difficulties emanating from the global economic meltdown might propel Obama to resort to greater protectionist policies, which might lead to other nations retaliating. The Bush administration, and more precisely the Federal Reserve Board, lowered the official interest rate to zero per cent, thereby weakening the US currency. The Big Three auto makers were also granted a huge amount of federal money just to resuscitate the US economy. If the Obama administration resorts to more extensive protectionist policies, including tariffs, Japan might drift closer to the Chinese market.

Thus, even while Obama will remain engaged in sorting out the mess in the domestic economy, East Asia is likely to receive lesser attention as compared to Obama’s current preoccupation with Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East. As noted, Obama will seek active cooperation with China, while maintaining existing bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea. Therefore, in pursuance of his policy of multilateralism, the Obama administration is likely to seek a new regional security architecture that combines a bilateral alliance system with a multilateral security cooperation regime. Prof. Chung-in Moon of Yonsei University, Seoul, observes: “We can expect the US will shift its emphasis from the logic of balance of power to that of the power of balance.”

Though Obama may get bogged down for some time in reviving the domestic economy, the nuclear issue in North Korea is unlikely to be left idle. It needs to be remembered that Obama has defined the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and defeating global terrorism as the twin pillars of his national security agenda. Hillary has already reiterated the same after assuming office. One possible way to engage North Korea is by promising diplomatic normalization of relations with North Korea for a cessation of its nuclear proliferation activities. Should Obama consider a basic treaty on normalization with North Korea in return for an acceptable verification protocol involving sampling, forensic activities, and access to suspected nuclear sites as well as the transfer of a sizable amount of nuclear materials, Obama would leave a mark of statesmanship for the world to take notice of. But then Bush too tried the option of ‘dismantle first, then we will normalize ties with you’ but failed. Obama might just be lucky?

In dealing with North Korea, Seoul might be flexible in cooperating with Obama if the latter opts for expediting the rapprochement with Pyongyang provided North Korea agrees to major concessions in verifiably dismantling its nuclear programs and weapons. The proposed trilateral US-China-Japan commission matches well with Obama’s preference towards multilateralism in dealing with the North Korean issue. If these three countries cooperate, it will be vital to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. It could mitigate a tense rivalry between China and Japan, as well as a potential conflict between China and the US that will emanate from power transition.

Thus, Obama’s Asia policy will mark perceptible change in its contour and focus. Obama is lucky to have many eminent experts whose advice would play critical role in shaping Obama’s Asia policy. Jeffrey Bader, who worked at the State Department and National Security Council, headed Obama’s Asia team during the campaign. Other experts who are advisors to Obama are Gerald Curtis, Kurt Campbell (a nominee for the Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs and strong advocate of the trilateral summit approach between the US, China and Japan), and Rust Deming, whose collective wisdom will come handy for Obama.

But things may not be as rosy as it appears. Institutionalization of a trilateral summit could cause serious security concerns in South Korea because of its potential exclusion. Most Koreans still remember how Korea was arbitrarily divided by the calculations of the major powers after World War II. North Korea and Russia will surely oppose the trilateral formula. South Korea would be more comfortable with a six-party summit among China, Japan, Russia, the US and both the Koreas. The complexities of the issues in the East and North East Asian region do not guarantee Obama the reciprocal cooperation from its allies and countries in the region. The nuclear issue in North Korea and the threat it poses is unlikely to go away so soon. Obama cannot take cooperation from US allies for granted. For example, more than 10 years have passed since an agreement to relocate the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa was reached, but the move is no where near happening. On North Korea, Japan’s tough stance and strict focus on the abductee problem, is a stark difference with other nations in the Six-Party de-nuclearisation talks. Obama would expect Japan to publicly cooperate rather than only stress the abductee issue.

Countries in the region have to do away with obsession with short-term gains, tactical and impromptu maneuvering, excessive value orientation, and the politicization of security and foreign policy issues. It is in the interest of both Japan and South Korea to strengthen the alliance relationship with the US by adopting flexible policy options. Such an approach would help maintain peace and stability in the North East Asian region.

East Asia Japan, Obama Administration, US-Japan Relations, United States of America (USA)